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Payout policies based on share repurchase programs provide greater ﬂexibility than do those
based on cash dividends. We develop and test an empirical model in which strongly governed
companies outperform weakly governed companies after announcing share repurchase pro-
grams. Our ﬁndings include positive associations between strong governance and both post-
announcement adjusted operating performance and abnormal stock returns. The results are
robust to sample selection bias, different sample criteria, governance measurement, and various
control variables. In addition, governance strength is associated with larger post-announcement
changes in CEO incentive compensation and merger and acquisition activity, both of which we
argue are consistent with strongly governed companies using the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility derived
from choosing share repurchases over cash dividends to drive better performance. Consistent
with current literature on attenuation of former anomalies, the associations we ﬁnd between
governance and post-announcement performance tend to disappear in the latter half of our
sample period.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation:
G34
G35
Keywords:
Corporate payout
Share repurchases
Corporate governance
Long-term performance
Anomaly attenuation
1. Introduction
We propose and test an agency-based hypothesis to explain the relation between company corporate governance and changes
in company valuation and operating performance after open market share repurchase program announcements (henceforth
share repurchase programs). For companies that possess it, free cash ﬂow presents a potential agency conﬂict (Jensen, 1986).
Companies can mitigate this conﬂict between managers and shareholders by simply paying out excess cash to shareholders
through cash dividends or share repurchases (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Cash dividends represent a costly, credible agency
cost-reducing pre-commitment to pay out cash to shareholders for the foreseeable future (John and Knyazeva, 2006; Brav et al.,
2005). These pre-commitment costs may include sub-optimal future investment policy, cash dividend taxation, and future exter-
nal ﬁnancing costs. Share repurchases do not face these costs, but do not provide the agency cost-reducing pre-commitment to
pay out future cash. Despite their lack of pre-commitment beneﬁts, share repurchases by US corporations represent a signiﬁcant
and increasing portion of total distributions.1
Following John et al. (2015), we develop a model where corporate governance and cash payout policies are substitutes for one
another in reducing agency conﬂicts. In the context of their particular governance environment, companies choose their payout
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policy. Firms with relatively weaker governance mitigate their inherently higher agency conﬂicts by choosing to pre-commit
themselves to future cash dividends, while strongly governed companies, with inherently lower agency conﬂicts, choose to main-
tain ﬁnancial ﬂexibility by paying out excess cash through share repurchases. In choosing its payout policy, each ﬁrm makes a
tradeoff between governance and payout type. John et al. (2015) report results consistent with this model, concluding that weakly
governed companies tend to use regular cash dividends, and strongly governed companies tend to use nonbinding share
repurchases (or special dividends) for payouts (see also Grullon and Michaely, 2014). Using a 21-year sample of repurchasing
companies, we examine whether adherence or lack of adherence with these tendencies is reﬂected in differential long-term
post-announcement stock and operating performance.
We ﬁnd that announcements of share repurchase plans by strongly governed companies that adhere to the tendency reported
by John et al. (2015) are associated with better long-term performance relative to weakly governed companies, which do not
adhere to the tendency. Our results hold after controlling for different measures of performance, multiple control variables, and
the self-selection problem identiﬁed by Heckman (1979). Our results are new to the literature, and suggest that the strength of
a company's corporate governance system plays an important role as an ex ante indicator of announcing companies' future
performance. However, this positive association between governance and performance only holds for the ﬁrst half of our sample
period. We ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant association between governance and performance in the period after the year 2000,
which is consistent with the ﬁndings in the growing literature on the attenuation of former market-related anomalies (Chordia
et al., 2014). We conclude that a ﬁrm's corporate governance system is both an important factor in the payout choice decision,
as was concluded by John et al. (2015), and an ex ante indicator of future performance, but that its association with performance
has recently diminished (Fu and Huang, 2015).
In Section 2, we develop our agency-based hypotheses by reviewing the literature on share repurchase programs and corpo-
rate governance, and brieﬂy preview our results. We explain our data and methodology in Section 3. We present and discuss our
results in Section 4. Our summary and conclusions appear in Section 5.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Substitution between payout policy and corporate governance
Our goal is to analyze the role corporate governance plays in the post-announcement performance of share repurchasing
companies. Managers of strongly governed companies are relatively more closely monitored, which tends to mitigate agency
conﬂicts at these ﬁrms. Weakly governed companies, conversely, face higher levels of agency conﬂicts due to their lower levels
of managerial monitoring. Gillan et al. (2011) show that individual corporate governance mechanisms may act as substitutes
for one another. For instance, companies with powerful boards tend to also have a greater number of protective antitakeover
charter provisions and vice versa, which is consistent with the existence of an optimal mix or adequate number of governance
mechanisms, beyond which there may be diminishing returns to additional agency conﬂict-reducing mechanisms.
Governance is not the only way to reduce agency conﬂicts. Easterbrook (1984) describes the agency cost-reducing role played
by cash payouts to shareholders via cash dividends and share repurchases, arguing that formal managerial monitoring is costly.
Regular cash dividends force managers to generate the cash to make the payout and to access outside capital markets more fre-
quently, both of which tend to substitute for tighter formal monitoring of management.
John and Knyazeva (2006) and John et al. (2015) argue that since a company's corporate governance system deﬁnes its level
of formal managerial monitoring, governance measures can be used to test the substitution between formal monitoring and cash
payouts. While not contractually required, as are interest payments on debt, regular quarterly cash dividends represent an implied
pre-commitment to pay out cash to shareholders. Surveys of corporate executives indicate that managers are loath to reduce or
omit a cash dividend payment (Lintner, 1956; Baker et al., 1985; Brav et al., 2005). This reluctance is backed by empirical ﬁndings
of signiﬁcant negative returns to dividend cuts and omissions (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Healy and Palepu, 1988). Consistent
with the agency cost-reducing role of dividends proposed by Easterbrook (1984), John et al. (2015) report event study results
showing that the market reacts more negatively when weakly relative to strongly governed companies announce a surprise
dividend cut. This stronger adverse market reaction when cutting their dividends combined with their greater tendency to pay
dividends supports John et al.'s (2015) hypothesis that weakly governed companies supplement their formal monitoring systems
by pre-committing to regular cash dividends. Conversely, the tendency for strongly governed companies to pay out cash by
repurchasing shares, coupled with a relatively less negative market reaction to dividend cuts is consistent with these companies
having sufﬁcient levels of monitoring without the need to pre-commit to cash dividends. For these companies, which already
beneﬁt from low agency conﬂicts, such pre-commitments are not only unnecessary, they may decrease value as the costs of
the pre-commitment outweigh marginal reductions in already low agency costs. Without the need to pre-commit to cash divi-
dends, distributing excess cash via more ﬂexible share repurchase policies allows strongly governed companies to take advantage
of value-enhancing closer ties between earnings, payouts, and investment policies.
2.2. Hypotheses
We hypothesize that substitution between strong governance systems and pre-commitment to pay cash dividends, both of
which reduce agency conﬂicts, implies a difference in repurchasing companies' post-announcement performance. Strongly
governed companies enhance value by not pre-committing to permanent increases in cash dividends, thus avoiding their
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associated pre-commitment costs and enhancing future ﬁnancial ﬂexibility.2 However, for weakly governed companies, the deci-
sion to repurchase shares precludes value enhancement from pre-commitments to cash dividends, and is incongruent with the
tendencies reported by John et al. (2015).3 When these weakly governed ﬁrms choose to repurchase shares instead of paying
cash dividends, any gains from ﬁnancial ﬂexibility are offset by the losses associated with greater agency costs. In general,
share repurchase programs will tend to be relatively more value-increasing for strongly governed companies, and this separation
between strongly and weakly governed companies should be reﬂected in differences in the long-term post-announcement oper-
ating performances and stock returns of the repurchasing companies.
2.2.1. Post-announcement operating performance
Prior post-announcement operating performance studies have reported mixed results. Grullon and Michaely (2004) report
that share repurchase program announcements are not followed by improvements in annual operating performance for their
sample period from 1980 to 1996. Lie (2005) reﬁnes the analysis by using quarterly data collected from 1981 to 2000. Lie reports
that announcing companies improve post-announcement operating performance for up to eight quarters relative to benchmark
companies selected by an algorithm based on past performance. However, this average improvement is limited primarily to com-
panies who follow-up their share repurchase announcements with actual share buybacks. Using a sample of companies announc-
ing repurchase programs between 1984 and 2002, Gong et al. (2008) ﬁnd that the more heavily a ﬁrm uses accruals to manage
pre-announcement earnings downward, the more positive the subsequent operating performance (see also Chan et al., 2010).4
Chen and Wang (2012) report positive (negative) abnormal changes in operating performance for ﬁnancially unconstrained
(constrained) companies announcing 1990–2007. Due to the costs of pre-committing to cash dividends, the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility associated with share repurchases, and the payout tendencies reported by John et al. (2015), we posit the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Strongly governed companies have higher post-announcement long-term adjusted operating performance relative
to weakly governed companies.
2.2.2. Post-announcement stock returns
The literature is replete with studies examining the effects of share repurchase program announcements on long-term stock
returns. Ikenberry et al. (1995) ﬁnd average 4-year excess stock returns of 12.1% in their sample of repurchasing ﬁrms announcing
1980–1990. Chan et al. (2004) collect a sample of share repurchase announcements made from 1980 to 1996 and ﬁnd 4-year
post-announcement abnormal returns averaging 23.6%. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) report 4-year cumulative average abnormal
returns of 24.2% in their sample of companies making share repurchase announcements from 1991 to 2001. Finally, with a sample
spanning 1984–2012, Fu and Huang (2015) report 3-year excess returns between 5% and 10% for their full sample. With the costs
and beneﬁts of cash dividends and repurchases, respectively, and the payout tendencies reported in John et al. (2015), we posit
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Strongly governed companies have higher post-announcement long-term abnormal stock returns relative to weakly
governed companies.
2.2.3. Anomalies
Recent work has shown that many of the equity market anomalies found in the earlier literature have diminished or disap-
peared completely (Chordia et al., 2014), and attribute this attenuation to increased arbitrage activity. Fu and Huang (2015)
ﬁnd that post-announcement long-term performance increases following share repurchases and seasoned equity offerings have
disappeared over the past decade, which they attribute to changes in the trading environment and enhanced regulations on cor-
porate governance and information disclosure. In order to test whether this weakening of the association between governance
and performance is present in our work, we split our sample into repurchase announcements made through the year 2000 and
those made post-2000, and posit the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The relation between governance and post-announcement company performance has diminished since the end of
year 2000.
2.2.4. Factors affecting post-announcement performance
If repurchasing shares provides relatively greater ﬁnancial ﬂexibility to strongly governed companies, it may be possible to
identify ways in which this additional ﬂexibility beneﬁts these companies. We investigate two possibilities. First, CEO incentive
compensation is intended to intensify managerial efforts to enhance ﬁrm value. Jensen and Murphy (1990) measure the sensitiv-
ity of CEO compensation to changes in share prices and report the average CEO's wealth increases by a statistically signiﬁcant
$3.25 for each $1000 increase in ﬁrm value. Mehran (1995) ﬁnds that equity incentives lead to improved outcomes, reporting
2 Possible beneﬁts of this ﬁnancial ﬂexibility include freeing up future free cash ﬂow for proﬁtable future investment opportunities, which we examine later.
3 Both Zwiebel (1996) and Myers (2000) develop models in which self-interested managers choose to pay cash dividends in order to preempt future control chal-
lenges or position the ﬁrm for future outside ﬁnancing opportunities, respectively. Following John et al. (2015), we assume that share repurchases also provide these
beneﬁts to poorly governed ﬁrms, but without the agency conﬂict-reducing pre-commitment beneﬁts of paying cash dividends.
4 Chen and Huang (2013) report that such behavior has decreased markedly since passage of the Sarbannes–Oxley Act in 2002.
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that ﬁrm performance is positively related to the CEO's equity-based compensation percentage. Core et al. (1999) link corporate
governance and CEO compensation to operating performance and stock returns. Separating out the equity component of compen-
sation, our tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 also ﬁnd a positive relation between CEO equity compensation and post-announcement
operating and stock performance. Increased CEO incentive compensation after the repurchase announcement is one possible
use of greater ﬁnancial ﬂexibility that may increase post-announcement company performance as stronger incentives lead to
increased effort, which leads us to posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. After announcing share repurchase programs, strongly governed companies invest relatively more in their CEOs'
equity incentive compensation.
Another potential use (or misuse) of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility that could inﬂuence post-announcement performance is acquisitions
of other companies, which is one of the largest forms of corporate investment (Masulis et al., 2007). If an attractive takeover
target presents itself, companies that have not previously committed to dividend payouts have relatively greater internal capital
with which to ﬁnance the acquisition (John et al., 2015). However, not all acquisitions beneﬁt shareholders. As Jensen (1986)
points out, managers have incentives, such as empire building, compensation plans focused on assets or sales size, and middle
management promotion incentives, to grow ﬁrms under their control beyond optimal size. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) agree and
report evidence that mergers can be good or bad for shareholders, and that acquirers in bad mergers that destroy shareholder
value can set themselves up to become future takeover targets. A commonly used proxy for value-enhancing investment oppor-
tunities is Tobin's Q, which is deﬁned as the ratio of company market value to asset replacement value (Lang and Litzenberger,
1989; Asker et al., 2015). Acquisitions by ﬁrms with superior growth opportunities are more likely to provide synergistic beneﬁts
to shareholders than acquisitions by ﬁrms with inferior investment opportunities. Wang and Xie (2009) report evidence that
when strongly governed companies acquire weakly governed ones, the merger creates more shareholder value. Masulis et al.
(2007) present evidence that supports their hypothesis that weakly governed companies are more likely to indulge in empire-
building and value-destroying acquisitions. In order to examine this aspect of how ﬁnancial ﬂexibility affects post-announcement
performance changes, we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. Strongly governed companies with relatively superior investment opportunities increase post-announcement ac-
quisitions of companies relative to other sample companies.
2.3. Contribution
To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to focus on the association between corporate governance and repurchasing ﬁrms' long-
term operating and stock performance. Following John et al. (2015), we measure corporate governance using the number of
state antitakeover laws in effect in the ﬁrm's state of incorporation each year. This governance measure is largely exogenous to
sample companies' repurchase decisions (Karpoff and Wittry, 2015).5 Since the decision to repurchase is made in the shareholder
payout policy context in general, we begin by studying tradeoff determinants between repurchases and dividends using probit
regressions. Consistent with John and Knyazeva (2006) and John et al. (2015), we ﬁnd that strong governance is positively asso-
ciated with the repurchase decision, but negatively associated with regular cash dividend payments. In order to analyze the rela-
tion between long-term performance and corporate governance, we use the two-step Heckman (1979) methodology, which
controls for sample selection bias. The dependent variables are the differences between pre- and post-announcement operating
performance adjusted for the performance of a benchmark company and the post-announcement abnormal stock returns. Our
ﬁndings show a signiﬁcant positive association between strong governance and post-announcement operating and stock perfor-
mance. We also contribute to the literature on anomaly attenuation. Consistent with Bebchuk et al. (2013) and Fu and Huang
(2015), we ﬁnd in our sample that the association between governance and post-announcement performance disappears after
the year 2000.
Our results are robust to tests using subsamples of ﬁrms that (a) follow-up their repurchase announcements with actual
repurchases, and (b) make unexpected repurchase announcements. We ﬁnd similar results after redeﬁning our corporate gover-
nance measure as a transformed version of the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index and we include a measure of internal
governance (John et al., 2015) showing that our results are robust to governance measurement. Finally, we investigate post-
announcement changes in investments. Consistent with a performance-enhancing use of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, we ﬁnd that strong
governance tends to be associated with higher levels of investments in CEO incentive pay and acquisition activity.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Repurchase sample
In order to analyze the share repurchase decision in the context of a ﬁrm's overall payout policy, we collect a panel dataset
comprised all 53,523 companies listed on AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE with the quarterly Compustat, Execucomp, Institutional
Shareholder Services/RiskMetrics, and CRSP data to compute our variables. For the panel companies, we used SDC Platinum to
5 Karpoff and Wittry (2015) list companies that lobbied for enactment of their home state antitakeover laws, and argue that the resulting laws are endogenous for
these speciﬁc companies. To eliminate this source of potential endogeneity, we remove these companies from our sample.
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identify share repurchase announcement dates made by US companies from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 2011, excluding
share repurchases made by non-US companies, ﬁnancial companies, ﬁrms that helped to motivate or actually lobbied for state
antitakeover laws, ﬁrms for which we could not identify the state of incorporation, and all repurchase tender offers.6 These
data screens produce a total of 1726 distinct quarterly share repurchase announcements over the sample period.7 All companies
with available data during the sample period are included in our panel and ﬁrst-stage Heckman regressions.
3.2. Governance variables
Following John et al. (2015), we measured the strength of a ﬁrm's corporate governance using an index of the number of
antitakeover laws enacted by the state in which the ﬁrm is incorporated. The smaller the index, which ranges from 0 to 5, the
fewer antitakeover laws were enacted by a given ﬁrm's home-state government, and the stronger the implied corporate gover-
nance. The state antitakeover laws include business combination, fair price, control share acquisition, poison pill, and director's
duties laws (Karpoff and Wittry, 2015). In robustness tests, we also measure governance strength following John and Knyazeva
(2006), who use an index (speciﬁed in Section 4.5) comprised three separate internal governance mechanisms to measure inter-
nal governance, and the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index as a measure of external governance.8 John and Knyazeva
(2006) transform both indexes to range between 0 and 1 so that 1 indicates the strongest possible level of governance. Panel
A of Table 1 presents various descriptive statistics for the variables used in our panel regressions, while their deﬁnitions appear
below (and in Appendix A). Panel companies are subject to a mean (median) of 2.22 (1.00) state antitakeover laws, with a
standard deviation of 1.64. The internal and external governance variables have means (medians) of 0.63 (0.67) and 0.58
(0.50), respectively. Panel B contains the Pearson correlation coefﬁcients among the variables. While the correlation coefﬁcients
between the three governance measures are not large, they are statistically signiﬁcant. The negative coefﬁcients between the
state law index and the internal (−0.052) and external governance (−0.144) indexes indicate that strong state-level governance
tends to be reinforced with strong ﬁrm-level governance. The negative coefﬁcient between internal and external governance
(−0.115) is consistent with a substitution effect between strong internal and strong external governance.
3.3. Control variables
Following John et al. (2015), we model the payout choice as a function of various company-speciﬁc control variables, and test
the statistical signiﬁcance of the addition of our governance measures. All control variables are lagged one quarter unless other-
wise noted. Free cash ﬂow is the sum of earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization, interest expense and tax expense less
capital expenditures to total assets, and controls for the excess cash ﬂow hypothesis (Dittmar, 2000); Book-to-market is book-
divided by market-value of equity, and controls for company growth opportunities (John and Knyazeva, 2006; John et al.,
2015); Log (total assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets and is included to control for small companies using repurchase
announcements to signal performance (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990); Book leverage is total debt divided by total assets
and controls for the use of share repurchases in capital structure policy (Chan et al., 2004); CEO options equals the ratio of the
aggregate S&P Black/Scholes value of CEO stock option grants during the year to company market value (Fenn and Liang, 2001;
John et al., 2015); CEO ownership is the ratio of the number of shares, excluding option grants, owned by the CEO to the total
number of shares outstanding (Fenn and Liang, 2001; John et al., 2015); Payout/OCF is the ratio of the dollar amount of total
cash payouts (repurchase and/or dividends) to operating cash ﬂow and controls for the payout size (Dittmar, 2000); Takeover
threat is the number of mergers and acquisitions within a Fama-French 12 industry group and ﬁscal quarter, and is used to control
for companies using the cash payout to deter a possible takeover attempt (Dittmar, 2000; Billett and Xue, 2007); Tax is the ratio
of tax expense to earnings before interest and taxes and controls for the inﬂuence of taxes on cash ﬂow available for payouts
(John and Knyazeva, 2006); Risk is deﬁned as the standard deviation of a company's excess returns and controls for the inﬂuence
of market risk on a company's willingness to payout cash to shareholders (John and Knyazeva, 2006); and Sales growth is the
quarter-to-quarter change in sales and controls for higher opportunity costs of payouts for growing companies (John and
Knyazeva, 2006).
3.4. Methodology
We compute adjusted long-term operating performance using quarterly operating performance data obtained from Compustat
following the Lie (2005) benchmark adjustment procedure controlling for industry, previous operating performance, and the
market-to-book ratio. Our intent in using the Lie (2005) benchmarking procedure is to ﬁnd the single industry competitor closest
economically to each sample ﬁrm immediately prior to the repurchase announcement. We compute each repurchasing ﬁrm's
6 For a discussion of share repurchase tender offers see Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981).
7 We treat multiple repurchase announcements made by a company in a single quarter as one announcement.
8 The internal governance index is based on relative rankings of higher institutional holdings (Cremers and Nair, 2005), smaller boards of directors (Yermack, 1996),
and higher proportions of independent directors (Weisbach, 1988) each of which has been associated with stronger corporate governance (higher equity value).
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adjusted operating performance by taking the difference between the sample ﬁrm's operating performance and that of the
matched benchmark company as follows:
Adjusted OPt;si ¼ ∑Tt¼þ1
OPt;si
T
 
 OPsi
 
 ∑Tt¼þ1
OPt;bi
T
 
 OPbi
 
ð1Þ
where OP is the operating performance for sample company si or benchmark company bi, T equals 4, 8, or 12 quarters subsequent
to the repurchase announcement, and OPi is the average operating performance over quarters −3–0 for companies si and bi. See
Lie (2005) for more information on selection of the benchmark company.
We compute abnormal post-repurchase long-term stock returns using monthly with-dividend returns from CRSP following
the standard (Daniel et al., 1997) portfolio benchmark adjustment procedure controlling for company size (market capitalization),
the industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio, and the previous 12-month total stock return (henceforth referred to as DGTW). We
implement the DGTW benchmarking procedure in July of each sample year by forming 125 benchmark portfolios. We compute
the long-term cumulative abnormal return (LCAR) for 12, 24, and 36 months after a share repurchase announcement for each
company announcing a share repurchase program. The LCAR for an individual security is the sum of the differences between
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Panel A: Variables. Descriptive company statistics for our panel data. Financial variables and SIC codes are obtained from Compustat.
Variables Obs Mean Median Standard deviation
Antitakeover law index 53,523 2.22 1.00 1.64
Internal governance 42,170 0.63 0.67 0.15
External governance 53,523 0.58 0.50 0.24
Free cash ﬂow 53,242 0.03 0.03 0.03
Book-to-market 53,493 1.59 1.14 1.92
Log (total assets) 53,523 7.55 7.44 1.47
Book leverage 53,431 0.39 0.39 0.25
CEO options 53,523 0.03 0.00 0.08
CEO ownership 53,523 1.46 0.15 4.32
Payout/Operating cash ﬂow 53,523 0.22 0.10 0.40
Takeover threat 53,523 5.39 2.00 7.77
Tax 53,503 0.24 0.29 0.49
Risk 53,519 0.02 0.02 0.01
Sales growth (%) 53,519 0.04 0.02 0.19
Abnormal accruals 1731 0.00 0.00 0.02
Panel B: Correlations among the regression variables (see Appendix A for deﬁnitions and abbreviations). P-values are in the brackets.
Index InGov ExGov FCF BM L(TA) Lev Opt Own P/OCF Threat Tax Risk Grow Acc
Index 1
InGov −0.052 1
(0.000)
ExGov −0.144 −0.115 1
(0.000) (0.000)
FCF 0.023 −0.013 0.037 1
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
BM 0.004 0.006 −0.026 −0.215 1
(0.345) (0.249) (0.000) (0.000)
L(TA) −0.016 0.239 −0.007 −0.009 0.072 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.110) (0.031) (0.000)
Lev 0.019 0.093 −0.048 −0.081 0.382 0.235 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Opt −0.061 −0.065 0.036 −0.032 −0.045 −0.176 −0.087 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Own 0.052 −0.153 0.103 0.052 −0.055 −0.144 −0.143 0.043 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P/OCF 0.014 0.015 −0.01 0.068 −0.132 0.052 −0.103 −0.01 0.006 1
(0.001) (0.002) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.175)
Threat −0.083 0.012 −0.011 −0.006 −0.123 −0.003 −0.216 0.09 0.022 0.079 1
(0.000) (0.018) (0.008) (0.187) (0.000) (0.495) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000
Tax −0.001 −0.027 0.015 0.138 −0.085 −0.002 −0.113 −0.003 0.032 0.038 −0.027 1
(0.893) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.619) (0.000) (0.497) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000
Risk −0.106 0.007 0.036 −0.187 0.334 −0.313 0.045 0.196 0.053 −0.116 0.069 −0.067 1
(0.000) (0.171) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Grow −0.003 −0.026 0.015 0.229 −0.025 −0.001 0.006 0.001 0.011 −0.08 0.004 0.015 −0.024 1
(0.421) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.881) (0.156) (0.896) (0.010) (0.000) (0.317) (0.000) (0.000)
Acc 0.013 −0.035 −0.049 0.046 0.043 0.01 0.042 −0.016 0.033 −0.085 0.042 −0.04 −0.082 0.133 1
(0.599) (0.160) (0.041) (0.055) (0.071) (0.670) (0.078) (0.509) (0.168) (0.000) (0.079) (0.100) (0.001) (0.000)
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a company's monthly raw return and the monthly return for the respective benchmark portfolio to which it belongs and is
given by:
LCARi;t ¼∑
T
t¼1
Ri;t  Rbi;t
 
ð2Þ
where T is the length of the accumulation period (12, 24, or 36 months), Ri,t is company i's raw return in the tth calendar month
following the share repurchase announcement, and Ri,tb is the analogous return to the benchmark portfolio b. See Daniel et al.
(1997) for more information on the development of the benchmark portfolios.
As we show in Table 2 below, a company's payout policy is determined by various company and market characteristics. While
our list of payout choice variables is extensive, there may be others, particularly nonpublic ones, which we have missed. These
missing choice determinants, if not speciﬁcally modeled, may produce biased estimated coefﬁcients. Following Li and Prabhala
(2005) we model our company performance analysis as a repurchase self-selection problem. The decision to announce a share
repurchase is a discrete event; a company either makes the announcement or does not. We model this decision with a probit
regression and the determining variables deﬁned in Section 3.3:
Choice to announce repurchase ¼ R ≡ r ¼ Ziδþ μ i N 0 ð3Þ
Choice to not announce repurchase ¼ NR ≡ r ¼ Ziδþ μ i≤ 0 ð4Þ
Company performance after announcement ¼ Yi ¼ Xiβþ εi ð5Þ
where Zi denotes the information expected to inﬂuence payout choice, δ is a vector of coefﬁcients, and μi is an error term orthog-
onal to Zi. When r⁎ N 0, the company makes the choice to repurchase and R = 1, and when r⁎ b 0, it chooses not to repurchase
and R = 0. However, we do not observe the value of r⁎, only the company choice, R or NR, when it decides to repurchase or not. If
Table 2
Corporate payout. This table examines the relation between corporate governance (antitakeover law index) and the corporate payout. Probit is used in columns (1)–(5),
where the dependent variable equals zero if a payout announcement is made and zero otherwise. Tobit with censoring at 0 is used in columns (6) and (7), where the
dependent variable is the ratio of the dollar payout to operating cash ﬂow. Standard errors are clustered by state in columns (2)–(7). Rep (Div) refers to repurchase
(dividend) announcement. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Robust z-statistics are in the brackets.
Speciﬁcation Probit Tobit
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable All rep [0/1] All rep [0/1] Rep only [0/1] Div only [0/1] Div inc [0/1] Rep/OCF Div/OCF
Antitakeover law index −0.019⁎⁎⁎ −0.019⁎ −0.048⁎⁎⁎ 0.050⁎ 0.031⁎⁎ −0.016⁎⁎ 0.029⁎⁎⁎
[−2.800] [−1.901] [−2.669] [1.671] [2.458] [−2.165] [3.226]
Free cash ﬂow 3.699⁎⁎⁎ 3.699⁎⁎⁎ 2.740⁎⁎⁎ 0.272 2.833⁎⁎⁎ 3.127⁎⁎⁎ 0.592
[9.924] [12.565] [8.346] [0.281] [2.968] [10.930] [1.298]
Book-to-market −0.097⁎⁎⁎ −0.097⁎⁎⁎ −0.041 −0.024⁎ −0.188⁎⁎⁎ −0.060⁎⁎⁎ −0.009⁎⁎
[−6.557] [−4.699] [−1.555] [−1.666] [−8.390] [−4.500] [−2.410]
Log (total assets) 0.080⁎⁎⁎ 0.080⁎⁎⁎ 0.014 0.160⁎⁎⁎ 0.096⁎⁎⁎ 0.043⁎⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎
[10.150] [4.862] [0.440] [6.167] [8.922] [10.028] [5.875]
Book leverage −0.170⁎⁎⁎ −0.170⁎⁎⁎ −0.145⁎⁎ −0.353⁎⁎⁎ −0.276⁎⁎⁎ −0.306⁎⁎⁎ −0.143⁎⁎
[−3.386] [−2.927] [−2.320] [−2.649] [−4.707] [−11.568] [−2.237]
CEO options 0.665⁎⁎⁎ 0.665⁎⁎⁎ 0.722⁎⁎⁎ −1.011⁎⁎⁎ −0.832⁎⁎⁎ 0.277⁎⁎⁎ −0.603⁎⁎⁎
[5.777] [4.393] [4.374] [−8.607] [−5.265] [7.856] [−8.341]
CEO ownership 0.001 0.001 0.004⁎ 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.409] [0.404] [1.663] [1.274] [0.230] [0.845] [0.248]
Payout/OCF 0.245⁎⁎⁎ 0.245⁎⁎⁎ 0.124⁎⁎⁎ 0.550⁎⁎⁎ 0.130⁎⁎⁎ 0.490⁎⁎⁎ 0.300⁎⁎⁎
[12.456] [15.388] [4.472] [4.720] [5.936] [39.244] [8.095]
Takeover threat 0.004⁎⁎⁎ 0.004⁎⁎⁎ 0.010⁎⁎⁎ −0.030⁎⁎⁎ −0.016⁎⁎⁎ 0.004⁎⁎⁎ −0.011⁎⁎⁎
[3.077] [3.350] [3.835] [−5.633] [−14.675] [9.006] [−6.309]
Tax 0.018 0.018 0.005 0.040⁎⁎ 0.054⁎⁎ 0.019⁎⁎ 0.007
[0.732] [0.597] [0.152] [2.073] [2.541] [2.356] [0.643]
Risk −0.698 −0.698 6.568⁎⁎⁎ −19.070⁎⁎⁎ −25.202⁎⁎⁎ −2.426 −10.604⁎⁎⁎
[−0.618] [−0.478] [5.239] [−4.484] [−12.342] [−1.467] [−8.844]
Sales growth (%) −0.141⁎⁎ −0.141⁎⁎⁎ −0.062 −0.185⁎ 0.053 −0.142⁎⁎⁎ −0.176⁎⁎⁎
[−2.326] [−2.699] [−0.791] [−1.928] [0.534] [−3.221] [−5.091]
Constant −2.470⁎⁎⁎ −2.470⁎⁎⁎ −2.527⁎⁎⁎ −0.470⁎⁎⁎ −1.423⁎⁎⁎ −0.544⁎⁎⁎ −0.065
[−31.703] [−14.713] [−11.670] [−3.720] [−15.264] [−10.006] [−1.467]
Observations 53,523 53,523 53,523 53,523 53,523 53,523 53,523
Pseudo R2 0.0434 0.0434 0.0347 0.115 0.0847 0.151 0.119
⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level using a two-tailed test.
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the company chooses R, then we calculate performance measures, Yi, for company i, in which case Xi denotes a set of variables we
expect to be related to company performance, β is a vector of coefﬁcients, and εi is an error term that is orthogonal to Xi. Since Yi
depends on choice R, εi in Eq. (5) is a function of Eqs. (3) and (4). Through substitution, Eq. (5) can be rewritten as:
Yi ¼ Xiβþ ρμεσελC Ziδð Þ ð6Þ
where ρμε is the correlation between bivariate normal error terms μi and εi, σε is the standard deviation of εi, and λC is the inverse
Mills ratio. We use the two-step Heckman estimation method to estimate Eq. (6). Stage one is a payout choice probit regression
(Eqs. (3) and (4)), the estimates of which are used to estimate the inverse Mills ratio for each observation. Stage two is an ordi-
nary least squares regression of Eq. (6) including stage one's estimated inverse Mills ratio λ as a regressor. The estimated coefﬁ-
cient on λ estimates ρ. Many of the control variables in Xi are also included in the set of choice variables, Zi, with important
exclusions. These exclusions provide identiﬁcation for our system of equation estimations, which otherwise could suffer from
collinearity.9 While variables Payout/OCF, Takeover threat, Tax, Risk, and Sales growth are intuitive possible determinants of
the choice to repurchase, it is less clear how they would affect post-announcement performance. Therefore, we exclude these
ﬁve variables from our stage-2 outcome regressions. Finally, since Gong et al. (2008) ﬁnd that companies tend to manipulate
earnings prior to announcing share repurchases, we include in Xi Abnormal accruals to control for any effects of earnings manage-
ment activities on performance. Please see Gong et al. for details on the computation of Abnormal accruals.
If there is self-selection bias introduced into the estimation of β, it will manifest itself as signiﬁcant correlation, ρ, between the
error terms μi and εi. The Wald test of independent equations (ρ = 0) is a chi-square test with one degree of freedom. The Wald
test rejects the null hypothesis of independent equations in the majority of our performance regressions reported below, partic-
ularly the abnormal stock return regressions. Therefore, sample selection bias appears to be a signiﬁcant problem in our sample of
repurchasing companies.10
4. Results
4.1. Probit regressions of payout policy
We begin by analyzing a company's payout choice. When choosing a payout policy, companies can make indirect payouts to
shareholders via share repurchases, direct cash dividend payments to shareholders, or both. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 present
probit regression results in which the dependent variable equals 1 in quarters when a sample ﬁrm announces a share repurchase
and equals 0 otherwise. The difference between these two columns is that standard errors are clustered at the state level in col-
umn 2 (as are the standard errors in columns 3–7) and are not clustered in column 1.11 In column 3 the dependent variable
equals 1 in quarters in which sample companies announce a share repurchase, without a concurrent dividend announcement,
and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefﬁcients on our corporate governance measure, the state antitakeover law index, are negative
and statistically signiﬁcant in all three columns, indicating that good governance is associated with the choice to repurchase
shares (a higher index implies weaker governance). Most of the estimates on the control variables are statistically signiﬁcant. The
decision to repurchase is negatively related to the book-to-market ratio, leverage, and sales growth, and signiﬁcantly positively relat-
ed to free cash ﬂow, company size, CEO stock option holdings, the repurchase yield, and the takeover threat.
Columns 4 and 5 present the results of estimating coefﬁcients for the same set of independent variables, but the dependent
variables are dummy variables equal to 1 when a company pays a dividend or increases the dividend that quarter, respectively,
and 0 otherwise. The primary results are those related to our governance measure, and are the opposite sign from those in the
case of the decision to repurchase. The positive and signiﬁcant estimates on the governance variable in both columns are in con-
trast with those related to the repurchase decision, the dividend decision tends to be made by companies with relatively poor
governance. These contrasting results for the governance estimates between repurchases and dividends are consistent with
those of John et al. (2015). As for the control variables, the decision to pay a cash dividend is signiﬁcantly negatively related to
the book-to-market ratio, leverage, the takeover threat, the value of CEO options, and the risk variable, and signiﬁcantly positively
related to free cash ﬂow, company size, the repurchase yield, and the tax ratio. In addition to the contrasting results for our gov-
ernance measures, we note three conﬂicting control variable coefﬁcient estimates for the repurchase and dividend decisions. The
results for CEO options were consistent with option-holding CEOs choosing to both repurchase shares and to not pay dividends.
Repurchasing shares reduces share outstanding, thus spreading company earnings across fewer shares, which tends to enhance
stock and option values. Not paying dividends prevents the loss of value associated with cash payouts as stock options do not par-
ticipate in dividend distributions. Similarly, the results for the takeover threat variable indicate that when companies are
confronted with a takeover threat, they tend to repurchase shares and tend not to pay dividends. The contrast between the pos-
itive and signiﬁcant estimate on the risk term in the repurchase regressions (column 3) and the negative and signiﬁcant estimates
9 See Li and Prabhala (2005) for a discussion of identiﬁcation in self-selection models.
10 As noted above, we could also model the sample selection bias as an omitted variable problem where the omitted information is the private information used to
help make the repurchase choice. In this case, statistically signiﬁcant ρ indicates that private information is important in making r⁎ N 0, and the decision to announce
a repurchase.
11 Coefﬁcient estimates are identical in columns 1 and 2, but the robust z-statistics are different. We present the column 1 results as those representative of the coef-
ﬁcients in stage one of the Heckman two-step methodology.
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in the dividend regressions is consistent with the idea that as market risk increases, companies are more reluctant to pre-commit
to and/or increase dividends, but are more likely to distribute excess cash through share repurchases. Finally, the results presented
in column 5 indicate that the factors inﬂuencing the decision to initiate a dividend for the ﬁrst time are similar to those inﬂuenc-
ing the general dividend payment decision.
Columns 6 and 7 in Table 2 present the Tobit regression results of repurchase and dividend dollar amounts relative to the
company's operating cash ﬂow on the same independent variables. The results are consistent with those in columns 2 through
5. Most importantly, the estimated coefﬁcients on our corporate governance measure are signiﬁcantly negative in the repurchase
regression and signiﬁcantly positive in the dividend regression. When accounting for payout size, rather than just a particular
payout type, strong governance continues to be associated with repurchases, while weak governance continues to be associated
with dividend payments. In addition, CEO option value and the ﬁrm's takeover threat level are positively related to the size of the
repurchase, but negatively related to the size of the dividend payment. Market risk is negatively associated with repurchase and
dividend dollar size, but signiﬁcantly so only for dividends.
4.2. Operating performance
Table 3 presents the second-stage results of the two-step Heckman estimation procedure where the outcome or dependent
variable is the 4-, 8-, and 12-quarter adjusted operating performance on independent variables, including the strength of corpo-
rate governance and control variables.12 Models 1, 2, and 3 contain the estimated coefﬁcients over the full sample period. The es-
timated coefﬁcients on corporate governance are all signiﬁcantly negative, indicating better adjusted operating performance for
more strongly governed companies. This ﬁnding is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Among the independent variables, repurchasing
companies providing higher levels of incentive compensation for top management tend to outperform those whose managers are
less incentivized, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. The negative and signiﬁcant estimates on book-to-market across the
three performance periods are consistent with Hypothesis 5; companies with better investment opportunities tend to outperform
those with fewer such opportunities. Finally, companies with more free cash ﬂow and less book leverage also tend to outperform
those with lower cash ﬂow and higher leverage.
Table 3
Operating performance. This table reports the second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement adjusted operating performance, which is computed
using the Lie (2005) benchmark method. Columns (1)–(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)–(6) and (7)–(9) present the results for the subperiods
pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets.
Dependent variable Adjusted operating performance
Subperiod Full Pre-2001 Post-2000
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Performance change after 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
Antitakeover law index −0.003⁎ −0.008⁎⁎⁎ −0.012⁎⁎ −0.005⁎⁎ −0.013⁎⁎⁎ −0.020⁎⁎⁎ 0.002 −0.002 −0.002
[−1.679] [−2.757] [−2.382] [−2.234] [−3.107] [−2.954] [0.715] [−0.517] [−0.292]
Free cash ﬂow 0.028 0.904⁎⁎⁎ 1.539⁎⁎⁎ −0.037 0.905⁎⁎⁎ 1.616⁎⁎⁎ −0.033 0.687⁎⁎⁎ 1.242⁎⁎⁎
[0.251] [4.263] [4.435] [−0.255] [3.365] [3.850] [−0.245] [2.621] [2.700]
Book-to-market −0.008⁎ −0.029⁎⁎⁎ −0.042⁎⁎⁎ −0.006 −0.017 −0.024 −0.003 −0.030⁎⁎⁎ −0.046⁎⁎
[−1.735] [−3.490] [−3.105] [−0.987] [−1.566] [−1.479] [−0.494] [−2.707] [−2.332]
Log (total assets) 0.004⁎ 0.003 −0.001 0.004 −0.001 −0.009 0.001 0.003 0.001
[1.815] [0.591] [−0.158] [1.253] [−0.199] [−0.882] [0.520] [0.556] [0.152]
Book leverage −0.024 −0.055⁎⁎ −0.090⁎⁎ −0.020 −0.106⁎⁎ −0.174⁎⁎ −0.019 −0.009 −0.018
[−1.639] [−2.003] [−2.004] [−0.821] [−2.387] [−2.504] [−1.158] [−0.286] [−0.317]
CEO options 0.046 0.198⁎⁎⁎ 0.311⁎⁎⁎ 0.012 0.068 0.047 0.066 0.284⁎⁎⁎ 0.547⁎⁎⁎
[1.352] [3.134] [3.012] [0.240] [0.756] [0.334] [1.569] [3.464] [3.807]
CEO ownership −0.001 0.000 0.002 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.000 0.001
[−1.245] [0.084] [0.878] [−0.405] [−0.312] [0.165] [−1.114] [−0.129] [0.319]
Abnormal accrual 0.094 −0.092 −0.453 0.054 0.087 −0.080 0.149 −0.347 −0.993⁎
[0.846] [−0.437] [−1.307] [0.357] [0.311] [−0.184] [0.892] [−1.062] [−1.729]
Lambda 0.0472⁎⁎ 0.0492 0.00152 0.0324 −0.0213 −0.0898 0.0188 0.0276 −0.0244
[2.076] [1.155] [0.0218] [1.213] [−0.436] [−1.174] [1.030] [0.772] [−0.390]
Constant −0.119⁎ −0.079 0.083 −0.078 0.133 0.381⁎ −0.045 −0.058 0.078
[−1.893] [−0.669] [0.430] [−1.078] [0.999] [1.837] [−0.811] [−0.534] [0.410]
Observations (censored) 1716 1716 1716 860 860 860 856 856 856
Wald χ2 12.22 58.73 69.36 9.531 44.93 53.20 6.765 33.55 39.99
⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level using a two-tailed test.
12 In the regression models for the full sample in Tables 3 and 4, the probit estimates are essentially identical to those contained in column 1 of Table 2, and are not
reported.
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To test Hypothesis 3, we split our sample into subsamples from 1991 to 2000 and 2001 to 2011.13 Models 4–6 (7–9) present
the estimated coefﬁcients for the earlier (later) sub-period. During the pre-2001 period, the estimated coefﬁcients on corporate
governance are larger and their statistical signiﬁcance is stronger than the respective estimates in columns 1–3. In the post-
2000 period, none of the estimated coefﬁcients is different from 0. This diminishment in the relation between performance and
governance is consistent with Hypothesis 3. It is also consistent with Fu and Huang (2015), who report a disappearance in
post-repurchase returns.
4.3. Stock performance
Table 4 contains the second-stage results of the two-step Heckman estimation procedure in which the outcome or dependent
variable is the 12-, 24-, or 36-month abnormal long-term stock return on independent variables, including the strength of corpo-
rate governance and control variables. Models 1, 2, and 3 contain the full sample estimated coefﬁcients. The estimates for our
governance measure are negative and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that strong governance is associated with better abnormal
stock returns 1, 2, and 3 years after the repurchase announcement. This ﬁnding is consistent with Hypothesis 2 and with John
et al. (2015). Only two control variables are consistently statistically signiﬁcant. Similar to the results reported in Table 3, the
relative value of CEO stock options tends to be positively associated with abnormal stock returns, which is consistent with
Hypothesis 4 and indicates that ﬁnancial incentives matter in generating better performance. Unlike the operating performance
results, smaller sized companies tend to have higher abnormal stock returns than larger companies. Finally, we ﬁnd limited sup-
port for Hypothesis 5 as growth opportunities are positively associated with stock returns only in Model 1.
Examining our pre-2001 subperiod results for corporate governance, reported in Models 4–6, the estimated coefﬁcients on
governance double in absolute value from those for the full sample, and their negative value indicates that strong governance
is associated with better performance. During the latter period, reported in Models 7–9, the estimated coefﬁcients are not statis-
tically different from 0. This difference in the governance coefﬁcients between the two subperiods is again consistent with
Hypothesis 3, corroborates our Hypothesis 1 ﬁndings, and is consistent with Fu and Huang (2015).
13 Chordia et al. (2014)note that decimalization of stock prices occurred in January 2001, and following them,we form subsampleperiods usingDecember 2000 as our
breakpoint.
Table 4
Stock performance. This table reports the second-stageHeckman regression results of post-announcement abnormal long-termperformance regressions,which is com-
puted using the Daniel et al. (1997) benchmark adjustment procedure. Columns (1)–(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)–(6) and (7)–(9) present the
results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets.
Dependent variable Abnormal stock performance
Subperiod Full Pre-2001 Post-2000
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Performance change after 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
Antitakeover law index −0.010⁎ −0.016⁎⁎ −0.014⁎ −0.023⁎⁎ −0.036⁎⁎⁎ −0.033⁎⁎ −0.003 −0.006 −0.007
[−1.769] [−2.199] [−1.680] [−2.268] [−3.020] [−2.350] [−0.519] [−0.697] [−0.702]
Free cash ﬂow −0.181 0.072 0.324 −0.998 −1.232⁎ −1.214 0.177 0.583 0.879
[−0.451] [0.145] [0.551] [−1.623] [−1.660] [−1.403] [0.479] [1.116] [1.409]
Book-to-market 0.026⁎ 0.000 −0.028 0.093⁎⁎⁎ 0.093⁎⁎⁎ 0.066⁎⁎ −0.022 −0.066⁎⁎⁎ −0.079⁎⁎⁎
[1.652] [0.023] [−1.204] [3.907] [3.241] [1.983] [−1.393] [−2.928] [−2.988]
Log (total assets) −0.018⁎⁎ −0.020⁎ −0.022⁎ −0.053⁎⁎⁎ −0.066⁎⁎⁎ −0.080⁎⁎⁎ 0.003 0.009 0.012
[−2.018] [−1.834] [−1.729] [−3.680] [−3.790] [−3.938] [0.399] [0.812] [0.921]
Book leverage 0.006 0.034 0.063 0.010 0.163 0.202 0.039 −0.033 0.004
[0.102] [0.527] [0.829] [0.095] [1.349] [1.429] [0.829] [−0.513] [0.059]
CEO options 0.280⁎⁎ 0.431⁎⁎⁎ 0.512⁎⁎⁎ 0.368⁎ 0.753⁎⁎⁎ 0.851⁎⁎⁎ 0.018 −0.260 −0.314
[2.348] [2.928] [2.931] [1.797] [3.049] [2.956] [0.159] [−1.604] [−1.625]
CEO ownership 0.002 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.005 −0.008 −0.003 −0.011⁎⁎ −0.013⁎⁎
[0.971] [−0.406] [−0.865] [−0.237] [−1.260] [−1.631] [−1.105] [−2.505] [−2.563]
Abnormal accrual −0.264 −0.798 −0.820 −0.085 −0.360 −0.388 −0.350 −1.170⁎ −1.041
[−0.660] [−1.622] [−1.412] [−0.139] [−0.499] [−0.455] [−0.769] [−1.932] [−1.454]
Lambda −0.003 0.124 0.220⁎ −0.408⁎⁎⁎ −0.579⁎⁎⁎ −0.604⁎⁎⁎ 0.102⁎⁎ 0.347⁎⁎⁎ 0.437⁎⁎⁎
[−0.0337] [1.235] [1.852] [−3.593] [−4.198] [−3.777] [2.014] [4.798] [5.064]
Constant 0.188 −0.014 −0.161 1.310⁎⁎⁎ 1.801⁎⁎⁎ 2.016⁎⁎⁎ −0.199 −0.683⁎⁎⁎ −0.879⁎⁎⁎
[0.839] [−0.051] [−0.492] [4.242] [4.809] [4.637] [−1.296] [−3.116] [−3.366]
Observations (censored) 1720 1724 1726 861 862 862 859 862 864
Wald χ2 24.86 29.78 30.40 42.27 51.83 43.18 5.025 25.11 24.91
⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level using a two-tailed test.
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4.4. Carry-through and fresh repurchases
In this section we investigate the potential effects on the association between governance and post-announcement perfor-
mance of two previously reported share repurchase characteristics. Companies announcing open market share repurchase pro-
grams are under no obligation to repurchase shares. Actual share buybacks depend on subsequent market conditions, and this
characteristic actually enhances the ﬂexible nature of repurchases relative to the pre-commitment associated with cash dividends.
That is, if market conditions change after the announcement making a share repurchase undesirable, the company can simply not
repurchase stock. Lie (2005) ﬁnds that about 24% of his sample of announcing companies do not repurchase any shares within the
announcement quarter, but that 76% of repurchasing ﬁrms continue to repurchase for at least one quarter after the announcing
quarter (see Fig. 1 in Lie, 2005). Gong et al. (2008) report that about 84.7% of their sample of announcing ﬁrms carry through
with actual share repurchases in the announcement and subsequent quarter, and only these ﬁrms manage their earnings leading
up to their announcements and experience improvements in subsequent performance. About 87.6% of our sample ﬁrms report
actual repurchases by the quarter following the repurchase program announcement.14 In Tables 5 and 6, we rerun our analysis
on the subsample of ﬁrms that follow their announced repurchase plans with actual repurchases in quarters 0 and +1. Compar-
ing Table 5 estimates with Table 3 estimates shows little difference in the relation between adjusted operating performance and
corporate governance or the control variables. For the full sample period (Models 1–3) and the pre-2001 sample period, estimated
coefﬁcients on the governance measure in Table 5 are signiﬁcantly negative, indicating a signiﬁcant association between strong
governance and better post-announcement operating performance. Also similar to Table 3, the relation between governance
and performance disappears in the post-2000 period. Finally, comparing the subperiod sample sizes allows us to examine possible
changes in repurchasing behavior. The pre-2001 sample size in Table 3 (Table 5) is 860 (723), while the respective post-2000
sample size is 856 (781). Thus, about 84.1% of the sample ﬁrms carry through with their announced repurchases in the pre-
2001 subperiod, nearly identical to the ratio reported by Gong et al. (2008), while 91% carry through in the post-2000 subperiod.
Anecdotally, more companies tend to carry through with their announced repurchase programs post-2000. Table 6 contains
the estimated coefﬁcients when the abnormal stock returns are the dependent variables, and while negative and similar in
size, the governance estimates using the full sample period are not quite statistically signiﬁcant using conventional signiﬁcance
levels. In the pre-2001 subperiod, the estimates are signiﬁcantly negative, while in the post-2000 subperiod the estimates are
14 Following Gong et al. (2008) we identify companies that actually repurchase shares using Compustat.
Table 5
Operating performance for carry-through repurchase sample. This table reports second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement adjusted operating
performance for the subsample that actually repurchased shares, which is computed using the Lie (2005) benchmark method. Columns (1)–(3) show the results for
the full sample. Columns (4)–(6) and (7)–(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured
in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets.*
Dependent variable Adjusted operating performance
Subperiod Full Pre-2001 Post-2000
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Performance change after 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
Antitakeover law index −0.004⁎⁎ −0.009⁎⁎⁎ −0.013⁎⁎ −0.008⁎⁎⁎ −0.016⁎⁎⁎ −0.023⁎⁎⁎ 0.001 −0.003 −0.003
[−2.163] [−2.767] [−2.293] [−3.009] [−3.211] [−2.905] [0.667] [−0.621] [−0.434]
Free cash ﬂow −0.049 0.826⁎⁎⁎ 1.483⁎⁎⁎ −0.120 0.860⁎⁎⁎ 1.562⁎⁎⁎ −0.016 0.801⁎⁎⁎ 1.461⁎⁎⁎
[−0.435] [3.825] [4.158] [−0.790] [2.957] [3.425] [−0.115] [2.811] [2.902]
Book-to-market −0.007 −0.028⁎⁎⁎ −0.038⁎⁎ −0.003 −0.015 −0.019 −0.003 −0.031⁎⁎ −0.047⁎⁎
[−1.290] [−2.631] [−2.190] [−0.434] [−1.023] [−0.797] [−0.445] [−2.536] [−2.175]
Log (total assets) 0.002 −0.002 −0.009 0.000 −0.005 −0.014 0.002 0.003 0.000
[0.921] [−0.389] [−1.151] [0.100] [−0.838] [−1.394] [0.521] [0.575] [0.017]
Book leverage −0.014 −0.037 −0.061 −0.012 −0.104⁎⁎ −0.176⁎⁎ −0.009 0.008 0.015
[−0.928] [−1.289] [−1.269] [−0.441] [−2.094] [−2.251] [−0.541] [0.242] [0.258]
CEO options 0.021 0.230⁎⁎⁎ 0.315⁎⁎⁎ −0.024 0.052 0.030 0.071 0.424⁎⁎⁎ 0.648⁎⁎⁎
[0.578] [3.237] [2.682] [−0.437] [0.506] [0.189] [1.486] [4.453] [3.847]
CEO ownership −0.001 0.000 0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 0.001
[−1.096] [0.235] [0.818] [−0.736] [−0.347] [−0.083] [−0.650] [−0.155] [0.279]
Abnormal accrual 0.071 −0.147 −0.603 0.026 0.043 −0.174 0.119 −0.439 −1.242⁎⁎
[0.606] [−0.644] [−1.605] [0.162] [0.139] [−0.362] [0.674] [−1.253] [−1.999]
Lambda 0.0261 0.00622 −0.0659 0.00380 −0.0593 −0.157 0.0150 0.0307 −0.0243
[1.277] [0.157] [−1.008] [0.156] [−1.268] [−2.133] [0.837] [0.859] [−0.385]
Constant −0.055 0.044 0.275 0.015 0.250⁎⁎ 0.571⁎⁎⁎ −0.042 −0.079 0.068
[−0.997] [0.415] [1.555] [0.236] [2.071] [3.009] [−0.757] [−0.719] [0.348]
Observations (censored) 1504 1504 1504 723 723 723 781 781 781
Wald χ2 9.181 52.20 59.66 11.63 33.89 38.21 4.138 44.18 44.14
⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level using a two-tailed test.
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insigniﬁcant. While the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated coefﬁcients is lower in Table 6, the general ﬁndings are consistent
with and supportive of our conclusions from Table 4. That is, strongly governed companies tend to have higher abnormal stock
returns after making share repurchase program announcements, but this association disappears post-2000.
Many companies continually renew their repurchase programs so that repurchase announcements may eventually be expected
by the market. Since they may provide a larger element of surprise, there may be a stronger market reaction to companies making
share repurchase announcements for the ﬁrst time, which Grullon and Michaely (2002) show empirically.15 In subsequent cumu-
lative abnormal return regression analysis, they run a separate regression with a ﬁrst-time announcer sample only and report
similar results to the estimated coefﬁcients using their full sample. Li and McNally (2007) examine a sample of Canadian compa-
nies and report a signiﬁcant difference in announcement period abnormal returns between ﬁrst-time (0.93%) and repeat (0.53%)
announcements, which they deﬁne as a repurchase announcement within a year of a previous announcement. Following Grullon
and Michaely (2002), we ran a separate regression with our non-repeat announcer sample, which we deﬁne as a repurchase
announcement that was not preceded by another announcement within the previous year, and which we term as “fresh”
announcements. Table 7 contains the results, using our fresh repurchase announcement subsample, of regressing adjusted oper-
ating performance on corporate governance. The sample size drops from 1716 to 1089, a reduction of about 36.5%. The estimated
coefﬁcients on our measure of corporate governance are very similar to those with the full sample in Table 3, and our conclusions
remain unchanged. Strong governance is associated with better future adjusted operating performance in the full sample, but that
association is limited to the pre-2001 subperiod only. We present in Table 8 the regression results using abnormal stock returns as
the dependent variable, and while the estimated coefﬁcients are larger in absolute value, their statistical signiﬁcance is somewhat
weaker. Our conclusions, however, remain the same as in Table 4: strong governance is associated with better long-term stock
returns for the full sample and the ﬁrst subperiod, but not the second subperiod.
Previous researchers have discovered that not all share repurchase announcements are followed by actual repurchases, and
that surprise repurchase announcements are more informative to the market. After accounting for these two characteristics of
share repurchases, we continue to ﬁnd support for each of our hypotheses.
15 Although they donot separate out the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for non-ﬁrst-time announcements, themeanCAR forﬁrst-time announcements (3.13%) is
larger than that for their full sample (2.57%).
Table 6
Stock performance for carry-through repurchase sample. This table reports second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement abnormal long-term stock
returns for the subsample that actually repurchased shares, which is computed using theDaniel et al. (1997) benchmark adjustment procedure. Columns (1)–(3) show
the results for the full sample. Columns (4)–(6) and (7)–(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are
measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets.
Dependent variable Abnormal stock performance
Subperiod Full Pre-2001 Post-2000
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Performance change after 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
Antitakeover law index −0.006 −0.013 −0.013 −0.018 −0.032⁎⁎ −0.031⁎ 0.001 −0.003 −0.006
[−0.866] [−1.573] [−1.436] [−1.502] [−2.307] [−1.924] [0.242] [−0.349] [−0.619]
Free cash ﬂow −0.246 −0.342 −0.129 −0.740 −0.753 −0.594 0.259 0.286 0.483
[−0.593] [−0.679] [−0.218] [−1.111] [−0.951] [−0.651] [0.648] [0.512] [0.723]
Book-to-market 0.046⁎⁎ 0.017 −0.007 0.144⁎⁎⁎ 0.151⁎⁎⁎ 0.132⁎⁎⁎ −0.014 −0.070⁎⁎⁎ −0.085⁎⁎⁎
[2.247] [0.663] [−0.245] [4.210] [3.729] [2.828] [−0.816] [−2.872] [−2.991]
Log (total assets) −0.021⁎⁎ −0.028⁎⁎⁎ −0.032⁎⁎ −0.041⁎⁎⁎ −0.051⁎⁎⁎ −0.064⁎⁎⁎ 0.001 0.007 0.010
[−2.391] [−2.601] [−2.560] [−2.725] [−2.873] [−3.115] [0.062] [0.625] [0.702]
Book leverage 0.013 0.087 0.115 −0.000 0.192 0.226 0.027 −0.016 0.022
[0.231] [1.266] [1.452] [−0.000] [1.425] [1.452] [0.553] [−0.241] [0.293]
CEO options 0.264⁎ 0.432⁎⁎⁎ 0.560⁎⁎⁎ 0.448⁎ 0.874⁎⁎⁎ 1.053⁎⁎⁎ −0.105 −0.434⁎⁎ −0.476⁎⁎
[1.950] [2.621] [2.900] [1.908] [3.143] [3.278] [−0.803] [−2.381] [−2.180]
CEO ownership 0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.001 −0.005 −0.008 −0.004 −0.011⁎⁎⁎ −0.014⁎⁎⁎
[0.531] [−0.578] [−1.031] [−0.400] [−1.195] [−1.524] [−1.138] [−2.606] [−2.698]
Abnormal accrual −0.291 −0.840 −0.870 −0.068 −0.418 −0.359 −0.512 −1.359⁎⁎ −1.408⁎
[−0.667] [−1.579] [−1.395] [−0.101] [−0.532] [−0.390] [−1.046] [−2.080] [−1.822]
Lambda −0.0737 −0.0142 0.0723 −0.433⁎⁎⁎ −0.609⁎⁎⁎ −0.615⁎⁎⁎ 0.0691 0.299⁎⁎⁎ 0.391⁎⁎⁎
[−0.965] [−0.153] [0.666] [−3.992] [−4.701] [−4.136] [1.376] [4.207] [4.597]
Constant 0.341⁎ 0.319 0.208 1.217⁎⁎⁎ 1.676⁎⁎⁎ 1.836⁎⁎⁎ −0.124 −0.569⁎⁎⁎ −0.755⁎⁎⁎
[1.648] [1.268] [0.707] [4.354] [5.021] [4.789] [−0.801] [−2.599] [−2.883]
Observations (censored) 1507 1510 1512 723 723 723 784 787 789
Wald χ2 21.08 27.29 29.69 39.15 49.47 43.05 5.315 26.85 26.59
⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level using a two-tailed test.
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4.5. Robustness to governance measurement
In this section we test our ﬁndings' robustness to the speciﬁc measure of corporate governance. Following John et al. (2015)
we replace the state-level antitakeover law index with two separate ﬁrm-level governance indexes. The ﬁrst is a transformation of
Bebchuk et al.'s (2009) E index computed as follows:
External governance ¼ 6 E index
6
ð7Þ
where E index is a count from 0 to 6 of six antitakeover provisions found most associated with performance (Bebchuk et al.,
2009) including staggered boards, limitations on amendments to company bylaws, supermajority voting for business combina-
tions and charter amendments, golden parachutes, and poison pills. External governance ranges from values of 0 for the most
weakly governed companies to 1 for those most strongly governed. The second governance index is obtained by sorting sample
companies into quartiles based on three different internal governance mechanisms. Higher institutional holdings (Cremers and
Nair, 2005), smaller boards of directors (Yermack, 1996), and higher independent director proportions (Weisbach, 1988) have
each been associated with stronger corporate governance. Sample companies are assigned an internal governance index (IGI),
based on the sum of the governance quartiles into which they land in any given year, where the strongest governance quartile
is assigned a value of 4 and the weakest is assigned a value of 1. We transform IGI into a measure consistent with external gov-
ernance using the following equation:
Internal governance ¼ IGI
12
ð8Þ
Internal governance ranges in value from 0.25 for the most weakly governed companies to 1 for those most strongly governed.
Both governance measures are constructed so that higher values indicate stronger governance.
Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) show that ﬁrm-level antitakeover indexes are associated with strong perfor-
mance, although Bebchuk et al. (2013) report evidence indicating that the association between governance and performance
has disappeared since the early 2000s when the Gompers et al. results became widely known. To account for this previously
documented association, we add a governance screen to our benchmark companies' selection when computing our performance
Table 7
Operating performance for fresh repurchase sample. This table reports the second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement adjusted operating perfor-
mance for the ﬁrms that initiate a fresh repurchase (no share repurchase in the prior 4 quarters), which is computed using the Lie (2005) benchmarkmethod. Columns
(1)–(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)–(6) and (7)–(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent
variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets.
Dependent variable Adjusted operating performance
Subperiod Full Pre-2001 Post-2000
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Performance change after 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
Antitakeover law index −0.002 −0.011⁎⁎ −0.017⁎⁎ −0.006⁎ −0.015⁎⁎ −0.021⁎ 0.003 −0.000 0.002
[−0.925] [−2.124] [−1.979] [−1.836] [−2.210] [−1.848] [0.897] [−0.038] [0.194]
Free cash ﬂow −0.079 1.436⁎⁎ 2.913⁎⁎⁎ 0.047 0.621 1.095 −0.148 0.594 1.415⁎⁎
[−0.260] [2.297] [2.805] [0.191] [1.268] [1.315] [−0.778] [1.589] [2.106]
Book-to-market −0.003 −0.046⁎ −0.077⁎ −0.010 0.009 0.034 0.002 −0.039⁎⁎ −0.058⁎
[−0.227] [−1.743] [−1.768] [−0.918] [0.438] [0.940] [0.166] [−2.108] [−1.773]
Log (total assets) 0.004 0.018 0.035 0.012 −0.009 −0.029 −0.000 0.004 0.009
[0.455] [1.112] [1.265] [1.465] [−0.583] [−1.054] [−0.008] [0.475] [0.556]
Book leverage −0.018 −0.109 −0.236⁎ −0.033 −0.048 −0.075 −0.027 0.022 0.016
[−0.474] [−1.373] [−1.788] [−0.688] [−0.505] [−0.465] [−1.079] [0.435] [0.177]
CEO options 0.037 0.294⁎ 0.555⁎ 0.083 −0.021 −0.149 0.030 0.168 0.372⁎⁎
[0.441] [1.668] [1.897] [1.016] [−0.126] [−0.533] [0.567] [1.591] [1.963]
CEO ownership −0.000 0.002 0.004 0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.001 0.002 0.004
[−0.340] [0.991] [1.543] [0.740] [−0.688] [−0.656] [−0.589] [0.556] [0.850]
Abnormal accrual 0.173 0.156 −0.054 0.130 0.285 0.201 0.271 −0.015 −0.457
[1.188] [0.554] [−0.117] [0.658] [0.761] [0.347] [1.235] [−0.035] [−0.591]
Lambda 0.0206 0.252 0.449 0.118 −0.318 −0.712⁎ −0.0121 0.00781 −0.0675
[0.157] [0.928] [0.997] [1.029] [−1.383] [−1.812] [−0.255] [0.0842] [−0.405]
Constant −0.061 −0.668 −1.219 −0.334 0.868 1.952⁎ 0.037 −0.026 0.113
[−0.169] [−0.902] [−0.990] [−1.083] [1.409] [1.850] [0.271] [−0.097] [0.236]
Observations (censored) 1089 1089 1089 573 573 573 516 516 516
Wald χ2 5.606 13.97 20.07 6.770 11.43 12.44 6.228 13.00 16.15
⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level using a two-tailed test.
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variables. We deﬁne well-governed, neutrally governed, and poorly governed companies as those with E indexes of 0 or 1, 2 or 3,
and 4 or more, respectively. We term these three groupings of companies the “governance groups.” In selecting the benchmark
company, using the (Lie, 2005) adjusted operating performance methodology or the DGTW abnormal stock returns methodol-
ogy, we require the matched company to be in the same governance group, thus controlling for the well-known “governance
effect.”16
Table 9 presents the second-stage Heckman regression results when the dependent variables are the performance- and
governance-adjusted operating performance of repurchasing companies, and when we replace the state law index with the
two ﬁrm-level governance measures deﬁned above. The estimated coefﬁcients on external governance are positive and signiﬁcant
for the full sample and pre-2001 subsample periods, indicating a positive association between strong governance and post-
announcement operating performance. In the post-2000 subperiod, the relation between external governance and operating
performance disappears. These ﬁndings are fully consistent with our Table 3 results using the state law index, and supports
Hypotheses 1 and 3. Finally, the estimated coefﬁcients on the control variables are generally consistent with those in Table 3.
Table 10 contains the second-stage Heckman regression results when the dependent variables are the governance-adjusted ab-
normal stock returns of repurchasing companies and the independent variables include our ﬁrm-level governance measures.
While the estimated coefﬁcients on external governance are positive for the full and pre-2001 sample periods, only the estimate
in Model 1 is statistically signiﬁcant. All the post-2000 estimates are insigniﬁcant and two are negative. While the estimate's signs
are consistent with those in Table 4, their general lack of statistical signiﬁcance indicates that support for Hypothesis 2 is weak
using these measures of governance. Interestingly, the estimates for the control variable internal governance are positive and sig-
niﬁcant for the full sample period and the post-2000 subsample period. The results for the other control variables are generally
consistent with those in Table 4.
4.6. Tests of factors affecting post-announcement performance
In this section we test Hypotheses 4 and 5. As noted in Section 2.2.4 above, investing in managerial incentives is one way
strongly governed ﬁrms can use ﬁnancial ﬂexibility to enhance performance. Table 11 presents stage two Heckman regression
16 Unfortunately, there are not enough observations to match a benchmark company on E index itself, which is why we develop and use governance groups as our
screen.
Table 8
Stock performance for fresh repurchase sample. This table reports the second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement abnormal long-term stock
returns for the subsample that initiates a fresh repurchase (no share repurchase in the prior 4 quarters), which are computed using the Daniel et al. (1997) benchmark
adjustment procedure. Columns (1)–(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)–(6) and (7)–(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-
2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets.
Dependent variable Abnormal stock performance
Subperiod Full Pre-2001 Post-2000
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Performance change after 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
Antitakeover law index −0.030⁎ −0.039⁎ −0.046 −0.027⁎ −0.037⁎ −0.035 −0.006 −0.014 −0.012
[−1.834] [−1.744] [−1.376] [−1.834] [−1.802] [−1.555] [−0.738] [−1.076] [−0.783]
Free cash ﬂow 3.478⁎ 4.259 6.370 −1.003 −2.106 −2.147 0.344 1.139 1.343
[1.808] [1.636] [1.633] [−0.919] [−1.415] [−1.290] [0.647] [1.360] [1.358]
Book-to-market −0.089 −0.154 −0.260 0.145⁎⁎⁎ 0.165⁎⁎⁎ 0.147⁎⁎ −0.023 −0.095⁎⁎ −0.121⁎⁎
[−1.130] [−1.420] [−1.603] [3.100] [2.603] [2.060] [−0.884] [−2.351] [−2.530]
Log (total assets) 0.079 0.091 0.141 −0.074⁎⁎ −0.114⁎⁎ −0.127⁎⁎ 0.001 0.014 0.021
[1.467] [1.263] [1.330] [−2.032] [−2.321] [−2.327] [0.085] [0.636] [0.871]
Book leverage −0.472⁎ −0.533 −0.670 0.117 0.392 0.448 0.079 −0.105 −0.001
[−1.704] [−1.519] [−1.332] [0.535] [1.369] [1.400] [1.001] [−0.897] [−0.008]
CEO options 1.154⁎⁎ 1.439⁎ 1.974⁎ 0.119 0.250 0.237 0.090 −0.059 −0.113
[2.071] [1.926] [1.780] [0.321] [0.495] [0.421] [0.599] [−0.241] [−0.392]
CEO ownership 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.001 −0.007 −0.010 −0.002 −0.013⁎⁎ −0.012⁎
[1.220] [0.547] [0.324] [0.113] [−0.799] [−1.034] [−0.554] [−2.098] [−1.721]
Abnormal accrual 0.013 −0.631 −0.897 0.032 −0.356 −0.575 −0.450 −1.361⁎ −1.668⁎
[0.019] [−0.670] [−0.638] [0.040] [−0.384] [−0.522] [−0.736] [−1.686] [−1.782]
Lambda 1.525⁎ 2.017⁎ 3.013⁎ −0.879⁎ −1.543⁎⁎ −1.586⁎⁎ 0.0941 0.646⁎⁎⁎ 0.777⁎⁎⁎
[1.803] [1.761] [1.779] [−1.703] [−2.181] [−2.014] [0.709] [3.062] [3.142]
Constant −4.058⁎ −5.202⁎ −7.839⁎ 2.529⁎ 4.380⁎⁎ 4.635⁎⁎ −0.194 −1.446⁎⁎ −1.815⁎⁎
[−1.748] [−1.656] [−1.689] [1.824] [2.307] [2.194] [−0.505] [−2.357] [−2.527]
Observations (censored) 1090 1093 1094 574 575 575 516 518 519
Wald χ2 8.702 7.563 5.317 23.19 20.22 16.22 4.635 16.13 15.94
⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level using a two-tailed test.
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results when the dependent variable is the sample ﬁrms' post-announcement changes in CEO options.17 For the full sample
period, Models 1–3, strongly governed companies tend to invest relatively more in CEO equity incentives than do weakly
governed ﬁrms. This ﬁnding supports Hypothesis 4, and is consistent with our regression results in Tables 3 and 4. The results
after splitting our sample into subperiods are consistent with Hypothesis 3; the association between strong governance and
investments in CEO equity incentives disappears after the start of 2001.
The dependent variables in the stage-two Heckman regressions presented in Table 12 are change indicator variables of the
sample ﬁrms' acquisition activity surrounding repurchase announcements.18 We develop Hypothesis 5 being mindful that strong
governance does not necessarily imply an investment environment with positive net present value investment opportunities.
Hence, we modify our governance variable to facilitate the joint test implied by Hypothesis 5. We deﬁne a dummy variable,
StrongGov, to equal 1 when a ﬁrm's state antitakeover law index is below the panel sample's median index value, and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, we deﬁne the dummy variable PosNPV to equal 1 when the ﬁrm's market-to-book ratio (which we use to proxy for
Tobin's Q) is greater than 1, and 0 otherwise. The stage-one Heckman probit regressions are identical to those estimated previ-
ously, although estimated coefﬁcients change when subsamples are used. In the second stage regressions, we replace the indepen-
dent variables antitakeover law index and BM with dummy variables StrongGov and PosNPV, respectively. We also include the
interaction term StrongGov × PosNPV. The interaction term captures the effect of strong governance coupled with superior
growth opportunities on post-announcement changes in acquisition activities. A statistically signiﬁcant positive estimated
17 We construct this variable by ﬁrst computing the ratio of the Black–Scholes value of CEO options granted to company market value for years 0, +1, +2, and +3,
where year 0 is the announcement year. To compute the change in CEO options granted we subtract the average annual post-announcement ratio from the respective
year 0 ratio. For example, to compute a company's 3-year post-announcement change in CEO options granted ratio, we ﬁnd the average option ratio over years+1,+2,
and +3 and subtract from it the year 0 ratio.
18 We construct the acquisition change indicator dependent variable as the difference between change indicators in the pre- and post-announcement periods. PreAcq
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm acquires one or more companies throughmerger or acquisition between quarters−3 and 0, and 0 otherwise. PostAcq is
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm acquires one or more companies between quarters +1 and +4, +1 and +8, and +1 and +12, for years 1, 2, and 3, re-
spectively. The acquisition change dependent variable equals PostAcq minus PreAcq and can only take the values−1, 0, and +1.
Table 9
Operating performance—robustness to governance measure. This table reports second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement adjusted operating
performance, which is computed using the Lie (2005) benchmarkmethod. Columns (1)–(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)–(6) and (7)–(9) present
the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets.
Dependent variable Adjusted operating performance
Subperiod Full Pre-2001 Post-2000
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Performance change after 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
External governance 0.029⁎⁎ 0.076⁎⁎⁎ 0.106⁎⁎⁎ 0.064⁎⁎⁎ 0.146⁎⁎⁎ 0.188⁎⁎⁎ −0.004 −0.012 −0.011
[2.349] [3.212] [2.743] [3.161] [4.033] [3.309] [−0.250] [−0.393] [−0.217]
Internal governance 0.040⁎ −0.009 −0.038 0.035 −0.026 −0.037 0.051⁎⁎ −0.021 −0.089
[1.660] [−0.190] [−0.517] [0.881] [−0.363] [−0.329] [2.055] [−0.412] [−1.021]
Free cash ﬂow 0.388⁎⁎⁎ 1.909⁎⁎⁎ 3.144⁎⁎⁎ 0.267 1.891⁎⁎⁎ 3.247⁎⁎⁎ 0.513⁎⁎⁎ 1.840⁎⁎⁎ 2.899⁎⁎⁎
[3.085] [7.997] [8.055] [1.607] [6.340] [6.912] [3.593] [6.308] [5.797]
Book-to-market 0.001 −0.025⁎⁎⁎ −0.047⁎⁎⁎ −0.002 −0.027⁎⁎ −0.049⁎⁎⁎ 0.002 −0.021 −0.038⁎
[0.115] [−2.781] [−3.236] [−0.357] [−2.395] [−2.821] [0.368] [−1.636] [−1.764]
Log (total assets) 0.003 0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.004 −0.009 0.007⁎⁎ 0.007 0.011
[1.440] [0.124] [0.163] [−0.146] [−0.629] [−0.887] [2.273] [1.061] [1.042]
Book leverage −0.050⁎⁎⁎ −0.143⁎⁎⁎ −0.246⁎⁎⁎ −0.011 −0.136⁎⁎⁎ −0.236⁎⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎⁎ −0.144⁎⁎⁎ −0.244⁎⁎⁎
[−3.090] [−4.638] [−4.888] [−0.381] [−2.731] [−3.024] [−4.159] [−3.869] [−3.830]
CEO options 0.108⁎⁎⁎ 0.235⁎⁎⁎ 0.385⁎⁎⁎ 0.043 0.095 0.117 0.186⁎⁎⁎ 0.369⁎⁎⁎ 0.619⁎⁎⁎
[2.895] [3.327] [3.336] [0.782] [0.956] [0.747] [4.143] [4.023] [3.939]
CEO ownership −0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.002⁎ −0.002 −0.002
[−1.469] [−0.526] [0.333] [−0.657] [−0.496] [0.240] [−1.763] [−0.910] [−0.514]
Abnormal accrual 0.110 0.045 −0.267 0.251 0.383 0.285 −0.203 −0.539 −1.174⁎
[0.892] [0.191] [−0.689] [1.469] [1.233] [0.583] [−1.143] [−1.459] [−1.841]
Lambda 0.0516⁎ 0.0744 0.0949 0.0498 0.0304 0.0159 0.0559⁎⁎⁎ 0.0731⁎ 0.0794
[1.952] [1.482] [1.157] [1.406] [0.480] [0.159] [3.065] [1.968] [1.247]
Constant −0.183⁎⁎ −0.173 −0.182 −0.169⁎ −0.061 0.033 −0.208⁎⁎⁎ −0.172 −0.145
[−2.348] [−1.170] [−0.753] [−1.747] [−0.350] [0.121] [−3.396] [−1.373] [−0.677]
Observations (censored) 1571 1571 1571 786 786 786 785 785 785
Wald χ2 26.86 153.6 172.6 17.54 117.8 133.6 41.28 92.73 92.01
⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level using a two-tailed test.
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coefﬁcient provides support for Hypothesis 5. In addition, StrongGov captures the effect on acquisition activity changes when the
ﬁrm has strong governance but inferior investment opportunities, while PosNPV captures the effect on acquisition activity changes
when the ﬁrm has weak governance and superior investment opportunities. Models 1–3 present the full sample period results.
The estimated coefﬁcients on the interaction terms in all three models are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, which is consistent
with Hypothesis 5; strongly governed ﬁrms with superior investment opportunities increase their acquisition activities relatively
more than other sample ﬁrms. The estimates on dummy variables StrongGov and PosNPV are all negative and statistically signif-
icant in Models 1 and 2, but not signiﬁcant in Model 3. In general, these results indicate strongly governed (weakly governed)
ﬁrms with inferior (superior) investment opportunities tend to reduce post-announcement acquisitions relative to strongly
governed ﬁrms with superior opportunities. The subperiod results are consistent with Hypothesis 3; statistically signiﬁcant results
pre-2001 become insigniﬁcant post-2000.
In this section, we examine two ways in which companies can affect post-announcement performance via the ﬁnancial ﬂex-
ibility afforded by share repurchases. Companies can invest more in executive incentive compensation, and they can invest more
in acquiring companies through the mergers and acquisitions market. Strongly governed companies tend to out-invest other sam-
ple companies in both ways. In Tables 3 and 4 we show that better post-announcement performance is related to stronger CEO
incentive compensation. Here we show that strong governance and larger post-announcement increases in CEO incentive pay are
related. These results are consistent with increased executive effort producing the better performance we document. Similarly, our
evidence that strongly governed companies with superior investment opportunities increase acquisition activity more than other
sample ﬁrms is also consistent with better performance.
5. Summary and conclusion
This paper ﬁnds that strongly governed companies tend to perform better after making share repurchase program announce-
ments relative to weakly governed companies. Using an agency–cost argument, John et al. (2015) show that companies with
weak governance systems tend to pre-commit to cash dividends, while companies with strong governance tend to repurchase
shares, concluding that the sample companies substitute strength of governance with cash payout policies in an effort to ﬁnd
Table 10
Stock performance—robustness to governance measure. This table reports the second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement abnormal long-term
stock returns, which are computed using the Daniel et al. (1997) benchmark adjustment procedure, plus a screen for governance group. Columns (1)–(3) show the
results for the full sample. Columns (4)–(6) and (7)–(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent variables are
measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets.
Dependent variable Abnormal stock performance
Subperiod Full Pre-2001 Post-2000
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Performance change after 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
External governance 0.116⁎ 0.093 0.046 0.132 0.169 0.135 0.077 −0.027 −0.064
[1.836] [1.080] [0.429] [1.147] [1.061] [0.690] [1.175] [−0.310] [−0.650]
Internal governance 0.241⁎⁎ 0.328⁎⁎ 0.373⁎ −0.044 −0.319 −0.295 0.293⁎⁎⁎ 0.550⁎⁎⁎ 0.685⁎⁎⁎
[1.990] [1.976] [1.818] [−0.193] [−1.013] [−0.759] [2.745] [3.858] [4.212]
Free cash ﬂow −0.132 1.080 2.481⁎⁎ −0.606 1.070 3.195⁎⁎ 0.124 0.528 0.785
[−0.208] [1.240] [2.304] [−0.644] [0.816] [1.973] [0.202] [0.644] [0.839]
Book-to-market 0.043⁎ 0.097⁎⁎⁎ 0.122⁎⁎⁎ 0.086⁎⁎ 0.147⁎⁎⁎ 0.203⁎⁎⁎ −0.012 0.013 0.015
[1.820] [2.971] [3.023] [2.477] [3.064] [3.386] [−0.456] [0.360] [0.377]
Log (total assets) −0.033⁎⁎⁎ −0.046⁎⁎⁎ −0.053⁎⁎⁎ −0.034 −0.028 −0.051 −0.016 −0.024 −0.041⁎⁎
[−2.670] [−2.735] [−2.585] [−1.590] [−0.959] [−1.405] [−1.229] [−1.388] [−2.067]
Book leverage 0.010 −0.029 −0.144 −0.014 −0.001 −0.208 0.010 −0.117 −0.077
[0.115] [−0.254] [−1.038] [−0.090] [−0.003] [−0.771] [0.122] [−1.089] [−0.646]
CEO options 0.475⁎⁎ 0.774⁎⁎⁎ 0.602⁎ 0.636⁎⁎ 1.296⁎⁎⁎ 1.246⁎⁎ 0.364⁎ 0.324 0.002
[2.521] [3.001] [1.888] [2.028] [2.974] [2.307] [1.884] [1.255] [0.008]
CEO ownership 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.000 −0.002 0.004 −0.005 −0.010 −0.015⁎
[0.788] [0.568] [0.787] [0.072] [−0.223] [0.442] [−0.990] [−1.418] [−1.877]
Abnormal accrual −0.562 −0.601 −0.966 −0.057 0.687 0.199 −1.027 −2.239⁎⁎ −2.705⁎⁎
[−0.887] [−0.692] [−0.899] [−0.060] [0.525] [0.120] [−1.304] [−2.168] [−2.283]
Lambda −0.0901 −0.0598 0.0386 −0.475⁎⁎ −0.728⁎⁎⁎ −0.535 0.0662 0.259⁎⁎ 0.246⁎⁎
[−0.675] [−0.326] [0.170] [−2.346] [−2.590] [−1.549] [0.846] [2.472] [2.060]
Constant 0.215 0.138 −0.082 1.180⁎⁎ 1.712⁎⁎ 1.352 −0.241 −0.699⁎⁎ −0.608
[0.546] [0.254] [−0.122] [2.131] [2.227] [1.433] [−0.917] [−1.984] [−1.513]
Observations (censored) 1565 1570 1571 782 786 786 783 784 785
Wald χ2 36.16 44.93 39.90 17.12 22.70 26.03 17.28 28.11 35.62
⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level using a two-tailed test.
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the optimal mix of agency–cost reduction and ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. Pre-committing to cash dividends constrains future decisions by
weakly governed companies, which reduces agency conﬂicts in these ﬁrms. In contrast, buying back shares allows strongly
governed companies to put their greater ﬁnancial ﬂexibility to work when attractive future investment opportunities appear. Bor-
rowing their argument, we hypothesize that ﬁnancial ﬂexibility gained from not pre-committing to paying cash dividends allows
strongly governed companies to outperform ﬁnancially constrained, weakly governed companies.
Using a largely exogenous measure of corporate governance, our empirical results indicate that strongly governed companies
tend to have higher adjusted operating performance and abnormal stock returns than do weakly governed companies in the 1, 2,
and 3 years after making a share repurchase plan announcement. This ﬁnding is robust to limiting the sample to only companies
that carry through with actual share buybacks, have not made a share repurchase announcement within the last year, and to a
different measure of governance. We also show that in the post-announcement period, strongly governed companies tend to
invest relatively more in CEO incentive compensation, and to increase their acquisition activity relatively more than weakly
governed companies, which could explain strongly governed companies' better long-term performance. In short, we ﬁnd that
strongly governed companies announcing share repurchases create more value for their shareholders in the post-announcement
period than do weakly governed companies.
Finally, our major ﬁndings are all dependent on the time period of the tests. The associations we ﬁnd between governance and
performance, and CEO incentive compensation changes and acquisition activity changes are statistically signiﬁcant over the full
sample period we study, and in the ﬁrst subperiod ending in December 2000. But the associations disappear in our latter subpe-
riod starting in January 2001. This last ﬁnding is consistent with the growing literature on attenuation of former anomalies as the
market is subject to increased arbitrage activities and enhanced regulations (Chordia et al., 2014; Fu and Huang, 2015; Bebchuk
et al., 2013).
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Table 11
CEO incentive compensation changes. This table reports second-stageHeckman regression results of post-announcement CEO option changes for sampleﬁrms,which is
computed by subtracting from the respective post-announcement CEO option value to company market value ratio the respective ratio for year 0. Columns
(1)–(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)–(6) and (7)–(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2000, respectively. All independent
variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets.
Dependent variable CEO incentive compensation changes
Subperiod Full Pre-2001 Post-2000
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CEO option change after 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
Antitakeover law index −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.002⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎ −0.002⁎⁎ −0.002⁎⁎⁎ −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
[−2.213] [−2.678] [−2.776] [−1.675] [−2.297] [−2.584] [−0.751] [−0.728] [−0.754]
Free cash ﬂow 0.081⁎⁎⁎ 0.122⁎⁎⁎ 0.120⁎⁎⁎ 0.057 0.066 0.057 0.059⁎⁎ 0.136⁎⁎⁎ 0.155⁎⁎⁎
[3.012] [3.200] [2.690] [1.593] [1.312] [0.983] [2.021] [3.251] [3.105]
Book-to-market −0.001 0.001 0.000 −0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003⁎ 0.003
[−0.578] [0.383] [0.240] [−0.121] [0.690] [0.516] [1.143] [1.693] [1.286]
Log (total assets) 0.000 −0.001⁎ −0.003⁎⁎⁎ −0.001 −0.003⁎⁎⁎ −0.006⁎⁎⁎ −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
[0.171] [−1.727] [−2.817] [−0.859] [−2.793] [−4.016] [−0.494] [−1.041] [−0.812]
Book leverage −0.004 −0.005 −0.005 −0.002 −0.004 −0.005 −0.003 −0.003 −0.006
[−1.138] [−0.949] [−0.937] [−0.300] [−0.462] [−0.504] [−0.818] [−0.601] [−0.981]
CEO options −0.095⁎⁎⁎ −0.207⁎⁎⁎ −0.290⁎⁎⁎ −0.137⁎⁎⁎ −0.277⁎⁎⁎ −0.366⁎⁎⁎ −0.062⁎⁎⁎ −0.145⁎⁎⁎ −0.223⁎⁎⁎
[−11.845] [−18.070] [−21.562] [−11.453] [−16.523] [−18.952] [−6.924] [−11.292] [−14.544]
CEO ownership −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000⁎ −0.000 −0.001
[−1.180] [0.174] [−0.058] [−0.844] [−0.223] [−0.707] [−1.888] [−1.238] [−1.366]
Abnormal accrual −0.074⁎⁎⁎ −0.115⁎⁎⁎ −0.161⁎⁎⁎ −0.093⁎⁎ −0.141⁎⁎⁎ −0.173⁎⁎⁎ −0.024 −0.035 −0.098
[−2.819] [−3.079] [−3.684] [−2.503] [−2.723] [−2.899] [−0.656] [−0.672] [−1.541]
Lambda 0.0109⁎ 0.0102 0.0127 −0.00144 −0.00910 −0.0111 0.00149 0.000944 0.00832
[1.948] [1.301] [1.393] [−0.222] [−0.996] [−1.066] [0.364] [0.166] [1.215]
Constant −0.022 −0.007 0.003 0.014 0.057⁎⁎ 0.085⁎⁎⁎ −0.003 0.000 −0.014
[−1.423] [−0.302] [0.106] [0.799] [2.260] [2.949] [−0.207] [0.015] [−0.676]
Observations (censored) 1686 1643 1602 856 845 834 830 798 768
Wald χ2 304.7 513.2 705.6 172.1 284.8 369.3 163.9 279.0 418.3
⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level using a two-tailed test.
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Appendix A. Variable deﬁnitions
Description
Variable Governance measures Source
Antitakeover law index
(Index)
The total number of antitakeover law (business combination, fair price, control share acquisition, poison
pill, and director's duties) in effect in the state of the ﬁrm's incorporation. Firms that motivate and lobby
for these laws are excluded.
Karpoff and Wittry
(2015)
External governance
(ExGov)
(6 − E)/6, where E is the entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al., 2009), which counts the total number of
the following provisions: classiﬁed board, limits to amend bylaws, limits to amend charter, supermajority
requirement to approve merger, poison pill, and golden parachute.
ISS/Riskmetrics
Internal governance
(InGov)
The average annual ﬁrm ranks according to the largest institutional holding, proportion of independent
directors on board, and number of directors on the board. The ranks are then scaled to [0, 1].
Thomson Financial 13F,
and ISS/Riskmetrics
Firm characteristics
Free cash ﬂow (FCF) (oibdpq + xintq + txtq + capxy)/atq, where capxy is transformed from a year-to-date to a quarterly
measure.
Compustat Quarterly
Book-to-market (BM) atq/(cshoq * prccq) Compustat Quarterly
Log (total assets) (LTA) The logarithm of atq Compustat Quarterly
Book leverage (Lev) (dlcq + dlttq)/(dlcq + dlttq + ceqq) Compustat Quarterly
CEO options (Opt) The ratio of aggregate S&P Black–Scholes value of stock options granted during the year to ﬁrm market
value. [(option_awards_blk_value/1000)/(cshoq × prccq_f + dlc + dltt)] × 100
Execucomp
CEO ownership (Own) The ratio of the number of shares held by the CEO, excluding stock options (shrown_excl_opts) to the
number of common shares outstanding, times a hundred.
Execucomp
Payout/Operating cash
ﬂow (P/OCF)
(dvy + prstkcy)/oibdpq, where both dvy and prstkcy are transformed from a year-to-date to a quarterly
measure.
Compustat Quarterly
Takeover threat
(Threat)
The number of ﬁrms involved in a merger and acquisition within an industry-quarter. Industry code
follows Fama-French 12 classiﬁcation.
Compustat Quarterly
Tax (Tax) txtq/(oibdpq − dpq) Compustat Quarterly
Table 12
Acquisition changes. This table reports the second-stage Heckman regression results of post-announcement change in acquisition activity for sample ﬁrms, which is
computed by subtracting from an indicator of acquisition activity in quarters 1–4, 1–8, and 1–12 the respective indicator variable for quarters −3–0. Columns
(1)–(3) show the results for the full sample. Columns (4)–(6) and (7)–(9) present the results for the subperiods pre-2001 and post-2001, respectively. All independent
variables are measured in t-1. Z-statistics are in the brackets.
Dependent variable: Acquisition changes
Subperiod: Full Pre-2001 Post-2000
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Acquisition change after: 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
StrongGov −0.092⁎⁎ −0.071⁎ −0.065 −0.129⁎⁎⁎ −0.168⁎⁎⁎ −0.170⁎⁎⁎ −0.025 0.067 0.093
[−2.377] [−1.683] [−1.494] [−3.425] [−3.649] [−3.301] [−0.332] [0.880] [1.250]
StrongGov X PosNPV 0.123⁎⁎ 0.140⁎⁎ 0.150⁎⁎⁎ 0.135⁎⁎ 0.161⁎⁎ 0.187⁎⁎⁎ 0.091 0.083 0.073
[2.403] [2.517] [2.614] [2.563] [2.495] [2.589] [0.992] [0.893] [0.806]
PosNPV −0.090⁎⁎ −0.082⁎ −0.063 −0.092⁎⁎ −0.069 −0.074 −0.070 −0.073 −0.026
[−1.998] [−1.678] [−1.237] [−2.043] [−1.247] [−1.199] [−0.852] [−0.887] [−0.321]
Free cash ﬂow −0.384 −0.458 −0.164 −0.817 −1.283⁎⁎ −1.432⁎⁎ 0.652 0.851 1.418
[−0.711] [−0.780] [−0.271] [−1.611] [−2.071] [−2.074] [0.746] [0.959] [1.611]
Log (total assets) −0.009 0.007 0.004 −0.001 0.012 0.006 −0.008 −0.004 −0.007
[−0.769] [0.565] [0.301] [−0.117] [0.879] [0.374] [−0.451] [−0.207] [−0.367]
Book leverage 0.010 −0.080 −0.029 0.015 0.035 0.222⁎⁎ −0.014 −0.134 −0.177⁎
[0.148] [−1.049] [−0.371] [0.183] [0.350] [1.996] [−0.132] [−1.266] [−1.683]
CEO options −0.461⁎⁎⁎ −0.455⁎⁎⁎ −0.257 −0.498⁎⁎⁎ −0.229 0.012 −0.377 −0.672⁎⁎ −0.583⁎⁎
[−2.909] [−2.635] [−1.442] [−3.000] [−1.130] [0.054] [−1.414] [−2.477] [−2.164]
CEO ownership −0.004 −0.005⁎ −0.001 −0.009⁎⁎⁎ −0.010⁎⁎⁎ −0.005 0.004 0.004 0.006
[−1.609] [−1.754] [−0.261] [−3.443] [−3.017] [−1.356] [0.549] [0.555] [0.837]
Abnormal accrual 0.308 −0.163 −0.723 0.020 −0.834 −1.203⁎ 0.481 0.210 - 0.683
[0.573] [−0.279] [−1.194] [0.039] [−1.337] [−1.729] [0.447] [0.193] [−0.646]
Lambda −0.113 −0.0609 0.0383 −0.249⁎⁎⁎ −0.271⁎⁎⁎ −0.302⁎⁎⁎ 0.119 0.219⁎⁎ 0.366⁎⁎⁎
[−1.183] [−0.588] [0.358] [−2.903] [−2.590] [−2.586] [1.109] [2.015] [3.395]
Constant 0.513⁎ 0.454 0.310 0.758⁎⁎⁎ 0.827⁎⁎⁎ 0.975⁎⁎⁎ −0.046 −0.108 −0.359
[1.771] [1.438] [0.953] [3.070] [2.749] [2.907] [−0.123] [−0.287] [−0.965]
Observations (censored) 1727 1727 1727 863 863 863 864 864 864
Wald χ2 19.28 21.26 12.85 35.99 33.19 25.58 5.883 16.98 25.22
⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level using a two-tailed test.
172 G.L. Caton et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 39 (2016) 155–173
(continued)
Description
Variable Governance measures Source
Risk (Risk) The standard deviation of excess daily return, measured as the difference between daily stock return (ret)
and daily value-weighted index return (vwretd) during a ﬁscal quarter.
CRSP
Sales growth (Grow) The quarter-to-quarter sales growth. Compustat Quarterly
Abnormal accrual (Acc) The average of the performance-matched abnormal total accruals (Gong et al., 2008) for quarter−1 and
quarter 0.
Compustat Quarterly
Abbreviations, in parentheses, appear on Table 1, panel B.
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